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ABSTRACT: This article explores the journal publishing industry in order to shed light on the overall economic 
consequences of copyright in markets. Since the rationale for copyright is among others to promise some market power 
to the holder of the successful copyrighted item, it also provides incentives to preserve and extend market power. A 
regular trait of copyright industries is high concentration and the creation of large catalogues of copyrights in the hands 
of incumbents. This outcome can be observed as the aggregation of rights and is one of the pivotal strategies for 
obtaining or extending market power, consistently with findings in other cases. Journal publishing is no different in this 
respect from other copyright industries, and in the last decade has experienced a similar trajectory, leading to a highly 
concentrated industry in which a handful of large firms increasingly control a substantial part of the market. 
It also provides a clear example of the effect of copyright dynamics on market structure, suggesting that a different 
attitude should be taken in lawmaking and law enforcement.
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1. Introduction
The economic research on copyright issues in recent times has been intense, boosted by copyrighted 
products’ greater weight in the markets and by the higher chance of infringement brought about by 
ICT and digital technologies
2. However, most of the contributions so far have treated the legal 
regime governing the “market for the expression of ideas” as a sort of exogenous factor that simply 
1 The author is greatly indebted to Piero Cavaleri, Michael Keren, Francesco Silva and Vittorio Valli for drawing their 
attention to the scientific publishing market and raising some of the key questions, to participants to UC Berkeley Serci 
conference and to Matteo Migheli for research assistance. This work is part of the CRT-Alfieri study on the law and 
economics of scientific and academic publishing. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2 The birth in 2004 of this journal focusing exclusively on the economics of copyright is a clear example of  the 
relevance of the topic in academic debate.
1characterizes the property framework needed to make trade possible and provides some incentive to 
the owner for creating and circulating new bits of knowledge
3.
Still, if one tries to observe the real economic life of copyright within markets, another 
interesting feature emerges: copyright plays a pivotal role in endogenously shaping the market 
structure as it provides a number of economic incentives far exceeding the simple reward for 
creative activities. 
Very often, the outcome of these forces is a drift toward industry concentration and a 
lessening of competition with an impact on efficiency. Another feature is the industry’s recurring 
split into two distinct segments: one in which incumbents with large market shares enjoy substantial 
market power by controlling large catalogues of copyrighted items, and one to which the other firms 
are relegated and left exposed to competitive pressure. Substantial entry barriers prevent movement 
from the latter to the former, thus preserving the persistence of market power.
From this viewpoint, the journal publishing industry investigated in this article can be seen as 
a descriptive example of the evolutionary trajectory of copyright industries. Over the centuries, and 
with a substantial acceleration in recent decades, the original goal of fostering creativity—shared 
equally by copyright and scientific journals—has been taken over by rent-seeking behaviors largely 
aimed at creating and preserving market power. 
The likely consequence in this domain affects the circulation and accessibility of scientific 
knowledge and research. This concern, already experienced to some degree as various research 
libraries  find themselves  unable to afford the same variety  of titles  because of increased 
subscription rates, has raised the alarm of scholars and research institutions that seriously fear how 
the industry’s current organization will affect their core activity. Some action has been taken 
accordingly, although the outcome is still uncertain.
Aside from the specific issue of science, these remarks suggest that we pay closer attention to 
the endogenous effects of copyright on market structure and the production of knowledge, which is 
by nature a cumulative process requiring broad access to previously created ideas. Proper 
consideration of these aspects might provide important policy guidelines to lawmakers.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an overview of the current trend in 
journal publishing, while Section 3 traces the main characteristics of copyright and scientific 
journals and emphasizes their common features. Section 4 describes the progressive transformation 
of the industry; Section 5 provides further insights into the endogenous role of copyright in shaping 
the market, including with reference to economics journals. Section 6 summarizes and comments on 
the main findings, and Section 7 concludes.
 
2. Background
The scientific debate on the economics of scholarly publishing recently gained momentum due to 
the remarkable increase in prices experienced in the last two decades. According to the Association 
of Research Libraries (ARL), a non-profit organization of 125 research libraries in North America 
including many academic libraries
4, between 1986 and 2004 the expenditure for serials rose by 
more than 273% and the average price of a serial by more than 188%, compared with a 73% 
increase in the consumer price index (CPI; see Figure 1). These statistics are merely averages; the 
figures become even more dramatic—in excess of +600%
5—for selected fields of research. 
3 Most of the debate has been focused on the creation incentive provided by copyright and on whether copyright 
infringement reduces profits and social welfare. For a broad survey on the economics of copyright law see Towse, 
Handke & Stepan (2008).
4 Ref. http://www.arl.org/
5 Edlin & Rubinfeld (2004) report that between 1984 and 2001, the price of physics and chemistry journal subscriptions 
rose  by 615% .
2Technological changes cannot be the main reason for the dramatic increase, as they equally 
concerned the publication of books, whose average price rose by just 63% (less than the CPI, thus 
implying some reduction from technological change, as expected); while total expenditure rose by 
just 77% (pratically mirroring the CPI trend).
While the data above concern the US market, a similar trend took place throughout the world 
(Dewatripoint et al., 2006) to the bane of libraries, whose budgets were crushed by the effort to 
maintain the same assortment of journals essentially at the expense of books and other items (Parks, 
2001; McCabe, 2002). Since then, the situation has become even more dramatic as budget cuts at 
academic institutions in many countries have made it difficult to maintain expenditure.
Figure 1: Book and Serial Expenditures in ARL Libraries, 1986-2004
Source: ARL Statistics 2003-04, Association of Research Libraries, Washington, D.C.
On the other side of the market, the buyers—mainly scholars and research institutions by 
means of libraries, who are also the main providers of input for scholarly publications—have 
reacted severely and sometimes tried to fight back. A number of scientific associations and their 
members have simply distanced themselves from publishers in order to stop legitimizing their 
commercial conduct; in some cases they have launched competing publications. 
In December 2006 the  editors of the  Journal of Topology, an international journal of 
mathematics founded in the late 1950s, resigned from their positions in reaction to the new 
publisher’s pricing policies, claiming that these would “[have] a significant and damaging effect on 
Topology’s reputation in the mathematical research community”
6. 
A comparable position has been endorsed by the European Economic Association, which in 
2002 decided to found a completely new organ, the Journal of the European Economic Association, 
after having invested 23 years in building up the  European Economic Review  (EER) that was 
6 Letter by the editors of Topology, August 10, 2006.
3published commercially. However, it is interesting to note that despite this divorce (which is also 
scientific as the board and editors resigned), the EER, through inertia, still enjoys a significant 
reputation that is keeping it safely near the top of the ISI ranking
7.
In other cases, well known research institutions have taken a clear position against this state of 
affairs: the Senate of Stanford University, for instance, expressly lamented that many journals were 
becoming “disproportionately expensive compared to their educational and research value” and 
suggested that researchers “not … contribute articles or editorial or review efforts to publishers and 
journals that engage in exploitive or exorbitant pricing”
8. Similar positions have been taken by other 
major US educational institutions, sometime fostering the countervailing publication of new 
journals. That has been the aim of Berkeley Electronic (BE) Press, founded in 1999 by Berkeley 
professors and intended, as stated on its website
9, to publish high quality peer-reviewed journals “at 
sustainable prices” (very often free after registration to individual readers) and provide technologies 
“to help the academic community produce, archive and disseminate scholarly work.”
A similar aspiration drives the Public Library of Science (PLoS), a project run by a non-profit 
organization of scientists and physicians “committed to making the world's scientific and medical 
literature a freely available public resource” that has so far published seven Open Access (OA) (i.e. 
not for payment) journals
10. In other fields such as economics, a number of selective journals have 
been launched with the cooperation of scientific associations. Two examples are the European 
Journal   of  Comparative  Economics,  published   on  behalf   of  the  European  Association   for 
Comparative Economics Studies, and this journal, which is managed by the Society for Economics 
Research on Copyright Issues
11.
The Open Access philosophy has also been fully endorsed by one of the most distinguished 
research institutions in the US: the National Institutes of  Health (NIH). Since December 2007, 
according to the “NIH mandate” signed by President Bush, that institution has “require[d] that all 
investigators funded by the NIH submit or have submitted for them to the National Library of 
Medicine's PubMed Central an electronic version of their final, peer-reviewed manuscripts upon 
acceptance for publication, to be made publicly available no later than 12 months after the official 
date of publication: Provided, That the NIH shall implement the public access policy in a manner 
consistent with copyright law”
12.
However, these feeble attempts at countermeasures have so far failed to change the overall 
state of affairs, whose inefficiencies are clear. First, research institutes in general and universities in 
particular   are   spending   significant   resources   to   buy   the   intellectual   output   of   their   own 
uncompensated researchers. By leading to a wasteful duplication of costs, this increases the cost of 
research.
Next, because ICT allows the cheaper production and delivery of research results, the price 
increase is based on market power. Since a substantial part of the costs per subscriber is fixed, the 
concurrent increase in potential demand would have permitted a reduction in prices had the market 
been competitive. As we have understood since Arrow (1962), the increase in the cost of access to 
knowledge has a serious negative effect on downstream creative activities (Ramello, 2005a). 
Furthermore, while in the past the market power enjoyed by the publisher was significantly 
attenuated by provisos such as the “fair dealing” exceptions of copyright law, which essentially 
provided a spill-over space of knowledge for non-paying users (Royal Society, 2003), these are no 
7 This explanation is available at http://www.eeassoc.org/index.php?page=14 
8 Available at http://facultysenate.stanford.edu/2003_2004/reports/SenD5540_serials_crisis.pdf
9 http://www.bepress.com/ 
10  http://www.plos.org/  The PLoS mission of building a public library of science includes “not only providing 
unrestricted access to scientific research ideas and discoveries, but developing tools and materials to engage the interest 
and imagination of the public and helping non-scientists to understand and enjoy scientific discoveries and the scientific 
process.”
11 The former is available at http://eaces.liuc.it and the latter at http://www.serci.org .   
12 Ref. http://www.nih.gov/ 
4longer effective in the digital domain. And advances in ICT, which are reducing the cost of 
disseminating information, seem paradoxically to be strengthening the hands of the oligopolists and 
leading to price increases. 
3. Copyright and the journal-publishing market
Scientific journals and copyright have something in common: both are aimed at fostering the 
production and circulation of new knowledge. Journals provide authors with a powerful means of 
diffusing a newly created expression of ideas, which potentially extends their reputation as scholars. 
Indeed, publication allows the scientific work to be circulated much more widely than it could be in 
person, while enhancing the author’s reputation by certifying the quality of the work through the 
process of publication itself, which is very often dependent on peer review (Boyer, 1947; Johns, 
2000). On the whole, it supplies an indirect economic incentive as far as reputation can be 
converted into career advances, research grants and other concrete pecuniary benefits
13. 
Copyright, according to a standard justification, should do the same by giving authors the 
chance to reap the benefits of newly created copyrightable works. At the same time, it solves the 
puzzle of providing private incentive to invest in creative activities and of serving the public interest 
by promoting advances in knowledge (Ramello, 2005a; Rothen & Powel, 2007; Towse, Handke & 
Stepan, 2008).
Copyright and scientific journals appeared at nearly the same time, the late 17
th and early 18
th 
century,   when   European   society   was   entering   an   intense   period   of   transformation:   the 
Enlightenment, which increasingly recognized the importance of authorial and inventive activity. At 
first, however, they bore little relation to one another, and the first two scholarly journals had a 
somewhat problematic relationship with copyright and its ancestors. 
In France, the first scholarly publication was the Journal des Sçavans (later renamed Journal 
de Savants), which appeared in Paris on January 5, 1665 thanks to the considerable effort of the 
politician and learned man Denis De Sallo; it would soon become the focal point of national 
scientific and literary society (Boyer, 1947). It is also familiar to modern economists as it is there 
that Joseph Louis François Bertrand published his famous critique of the Cournot oligopoly in 
1883. 
It is worth noting that the popularity of this journal owed much to the flourishing number of 
pirated copies that were widely distributed in France, openly infringing the printing  privilegii 
granted by the state which were the ancestors of droit d’auteur.
In England, the publication of the Philosophical Transactions by the Royal Society of London 
in 1665 was crucial to disseminating the work of many scholars, including Newton, Boyle, Leibniz, 
Cassini and Halley. In this case too, the venture was possible thanks to a royal exemption from the 
charter granted in 1557 by Philip and Mary Tudor to the Stationers Company, which for nearly 150 
years gave it a heavily criticized monopoly on printing and publishing in England (Johns, 2000; 
Nicita & Ramello, 2007).
For a long time thereafter, the relationship between copyright and scientific journals was 
merely occasional; because many of the earliest journal publishers were learned societies and then 
academic institutions, copyright was licensed explicitly or implicitly to them, though it did not have 
a central role in the business. Nonetheless, this was the foundation of the model on which academic 
journals were later organized: the publisher acquires copyright over published papers, and in 
exchange invests the crucial resources in manuscript revision and formatting and in the printing and 
delivery of physical issues (Page, Campbell & Meadows, 1996). 
13 As we will discuss later on,  reputation is a pivotal element of scientific publication for journals as well.
54. The transformation of the journal-publishing industry: key elements
As mentioned above, in the beginning these publishers were often scientific associations or 
universities. But this has been changing: commercial publishers have increasingly been entering the 
market by introducing new journals, at times on behalf of scientific associations or individual 
scholars, at times by acquiring existing titles. Over the years these dynamics have led to a 
significant concentration in the academic publishing industry, in line with what has happened in 
other copyright industries (Silva & Ramello, 2000; McCabe, 2002; Edlin & Rubinfeld, 2004; Nicita 
& Ramello, 2007; Ramello & Silva, 2008). As we have seen, the result of increasing concentration 
has been price growth far exceeding the rate of inflation and a substantial rise in costs. 
To make matters worse, several commercial players have now adopted strategies of multi-part 
tariff pricing and bundling of the titles they own in all disciplines in an attempt to extract much of 
the buyers' surplus (OFT, 2002; Edlin & Rubinfeld, 2004). In general the fixed part, that plays the 
role of an admission fee, equals the cost of the printed items bought in previous years, while the 
variable part consists of the subscription to an online database, which is the preferred resource for 
many researchers. If an institution decides to unsubscribe from a number of printed journals, thus 
reducing the admission fee, a balancing mechanism has been set up that increases the variable part, 
thus preserving the total cost (Dewatripont et al., 2006). As an example, consider the case of an 
Italian middle sized university facing a large European publisher that has announced an increase in 
subscription rates for the three years 2009-2012 by about 20% for the “admission fee” (just over 6% 
annually) and by nearly 66% for the variable part, i.e., by over 17%, or one sixth per annum. This 
strategy is hard to counter, as the variable part of the tariff is less constrained and introduces a 
higher degree of uncertainty about the total future fee. Additionally, while bundling essentially 
provides a means of discriminating that raises producer profits and sometimes the social welfare, in 
the specific case of journal publishing—where some titles are subject to market power, as we shall 
see below—it offers incumbents a device for foreclosing the market to small players and 
newcomers.
Moreover, the slight though steady shift from the purchase of printed journals to admittance to 
databases is also transforming the accessibility of the resources in an intertemporal perspective. 
While printed journals, once acquired, become an asset that can be used in the future, access to a 
database is given only for the duration of the contract and hence introduces a higher uncertainty for 
the future, giving more power to the seller who has control over a broader catalogue of input.
The current state of affairs is leading to serious problems of access to research input by the 
scientific community, increasing concern for the future while already posing obstacles to the less 
affluent parts of the scientific community, particularly in low-income countries but also in the 
developed world (Nevo, Rubinfeld & McCabe, 2005). The publishers’ strategies are presenting 
universities and research institutions with a difficult choice as to how to allocate their funds, at the 
very time when budgets are getting tighter (Parks, 2001). Last but not least, since publishers depend 
on the availability and exclusive control of copyright, they are somewhat contradicting the aim of 
fostering the production and diffusion of new knowledge.
Another feature that strengthens the market power of incumbents is the journal’s reputation, 
which is a central element for attracting both authors and readers.
Journals are often ranked, and their ranking is roughly determined by the numbers of readers 
and citations. To attract good submissions a journal needs to build a reputation, a readership that 
will, at the least, browse its contents and read the relevant articles. Yet readers will spend time 
perusing a journal only if they are assured that they may find in it material that is worth their time. 
This is a chicken-egg problem: good papers raise the interest of readers, but they will not be 
submitted to a publication that fails to attract readers’ interest (Spier, 2002; Cavaleri et al., 2009)
14.
14 Reputation here is the pivotal element of differentiation and hence market power. However, “this reputation is much 
more complex in its formation than the reputation of most branded products, such as a Mercedes automobile, and it is 
6The audience of an academic journal, the set of its potential readers, is only indirectly affected 
by its price, which is usually borne by the library. These readers' time is a highly constrained 
resource and the time and attention they can allocate to scientific literature is limited. Most 
researchers read only the top journals in their wider field, plus a selected range of the journals in 
their area of specialization. Consequently, the top journals and a few specialized ones get most 
citations. This contributes to the stickiness of journal rankings, be they based on the ISI Thomson 
impact factor or an alternative database
15. Along with the concentration of publishers described 
above, this feedback increases the market power of the main publishing houses.
Thus the opportunity cost of reading a given journal, and indirectly that of submitting to it, is 
primarily composed of the costs of time and only partly of the pecuniary expense usually borne by 
the institutions. When it comes to submission, the “publish or perish” rule leads researchers to send 
their work to the most visible and high-reputation journals (Spier, 2002). This raises the importance 
of quality as the almost exclusive consideration for reading a journal, and if the quality of a journal 
is not perceived as comparable to the best, only those who are unable to access the paying ones will 
choose to read (and indirectly—to submit to) it
16. A journal may in this manner be turned into an 
Akerlof (1970) “lemon.”
Technological advancement could partially solve this  puzzle in the form of electronic 
publishing, which essentially provides ease of entry for newcomers and broad distribution, 
especially when following the Open Access (OA) model (Rothen & Powell, 2007). However, the 
conundrum of reputation it is not easy to solve because a new journal, even if free on the web (zero 
price), is not assured of a readership and most assuredly not of worthwhile submissions due to the 
lack of information about quality. That’s why many of the new OA (or quasi OA) journals have 
tried to provide additional devices, for instance by heavily exploiting the link with complementary 
reputation signals such as being published by a well-known institution—as in the case of Berkeley 
Electronic Press—or a scientific society as in the case of  PloS, the  European Journal of 
Comparative Economics (linked with the European Society for Comparative Economics Studies) 
and RERCI (the organ of the Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues) (Cavaleri et al., 
2009).
Another way to try to draw more attention is to become part of a bundle, so that some 
economies of scale in attracting readers’ and submitters’ interest can be generated by the existence 
of a critical mass of journals
17. Even better, the new journal can “borrow” the reputation of other 
publications that are part of the bundle, mimicking what the marketing industry terms “brand 
extension” and “brand stretching”
18. 
In all, while the convenience of being available on the web may be to a journal’s advantage, it 
cannot in itself ensure the journal’s success. The technical feasibility of starting an e-journal, 
although much easier than a traditional print journal, does not translate into a positive outcome in 
terms of attracting authors and readers. 
hard to reproduce […and w]hat makes a journal valuable is the simultaneous consensus of authors, reviewers, editors, 
libraries, readers, tenure committees and indexing services  […]” (Edlin & Rubinfled, 2004).
15  While  ISI  impact  factor   is  still  a   well   recognized   reference,   other  systems   are  contending  for  the  role 
(http://www.isiwebofknowledge.com/). For instance, in economics REPEC provides a different kind of impact factor 
calculated on its own databases (www.repec.org), the ranking of US law journals provided by the School of Law of 
Washington   and   Lee   University   (available   at  http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/index.aspx),   and   the   H   index   (ref. 
http://www.harzing.com/pop.htm) has recently been devised to rank scholars and journals. National research evaluation 
agencies have also released their own rankings; e.g. in France the Agence pour l’Evaluation de la Recherche et de 
l’Einsegnement  Supérieur (AERES;  http://www.aeres-evaluation.fr/) provides a national  ranking of journals to 
researchers.
16 Parks (2001) provides a compelling analysis of the motives of the various actors in this market.
17 This strategy has been followed by BE Press and PloS but also by the American Economic Association, which has 
launched a number of new journals together.
18 Both techniques are intended to shift the incremental utility (goodwill) produced by a brand from the original market 
to a different one.
75. Copyright and the endogenous market structure: a view from economics journals
The two pivotal features of modern copyright industries are the poor substitutability of the 
copyrighted item, and the excludability enforced by copyright, which enables the holder to demand 
a price for access. 
Poor substitutability relates to the uniqueness of the information good—the lower the 
substitutability, the higher the potential value to the consumer—and accordingly makes sense of 
having copyright
19. 
It is important to note that this aspect figures more prominently in the articles of scientific 
journals than in other information goods. Since research is an incremental activity based on 
previously created knowledge, follow-on researchers rely heavily and unavoidably on earlier 
contributions, to the point that their own advances must necessarily start from the “prior art” and in 
the absence of it any serious further “advance,” as the term itself suggests, will be prevented
20. In 
this respect, access to previous research is crucial, especially when this work has been published in 
a well known journal that makes it an essential reference to scholars. In general, we can say that 
researchers’ demand for articles and journals is somewhat inelastic and allows the publisher to 
enjoy a strong monopoly. 
This rigidity is somewhat attenuated for the real buyers—i.e the libraries—that act upstream 
from researchers, and should therefore maximize the utility of a number of researchers subject to 
budget constraints (McCabe, 2002; Parks 2001). 
The legal excludability provided by copyright aims to give the first owner the possibility to 
exact a price for accessing the newly created work (Ramello & Silva, 2008). Of course, the outcome 
of this is to ration demand and accordingly to reduce access to essential inputs for follow-on 
creators, thus producing an adverse effect on the incremental development of knowledge. Because 
the consequences are more severe as the price increases, the actual amount of the price is really the 
crucial matter. If the price approaches the average cost, the exclusion will be kept as low as possible 
and in turn the negative consequences on incremental knowledge will be minimal (Ramello, 2005a 
& 2008). 
This will be a maximizing strategy from the social perspective, while the individual incentive 
of the right holder diverges because the more rewarding choice will be the proper exploitation of the 
price-cost differential, possibly as a monopoly. This is affordable when the license to the right is 
exclusive, which explains why nowadays exclusivity has been extensively interpreted as a value per 
se and has been widely enforced in the resale to downstream markets, such for instance in 
publishing. The exclusivity clause potentially gives the licensee the chance to be a monopolist; in 
turn, the right owner in most cases bids for the license according to an exclusivity regime for 
extracting the reservation price. In many areas of copyright, these dynamics have transformed 
competition “in the market” into competition “for the market,” with some negative consequences 
for efficiency (Ramello & Silva, 2008).
This arrangement has essentially converted the legal monopoly given via copyright—which is 
an exclusive right over a given resource—into an economic monopoly, i.e., an exclusive right over 
a market. In an economic monopoly, whoever gets exclusive control of the right gains market 
power over a specific demand. In general, market power intended as the ability to raise the price 
above cost is inversely correlated with the perceived uniqueness of the good, which in the case of 
19 If copyrighted works were homogenous we would not need copyright, as it would make more economic sense to 
reward just one creator and leave the output available to society. It is variety that justifies the existence of copyright.
20 By nature, creative activity is a process recombining previous knowledge which is simultaneously an output, an input 
and a technology; hence, any severe restriction on the use of existing knowledge will hamper the incremental process of 
knowledge development, as argued in Ramello (2008). 
8copyrighted items, despite being somewhat exogenous, can then be endogenously enhanced (Silva 
& Ramello, 2000; Motta, 2004). 
In the case of scientific publishing, uniqueness is enhanced by the certification of quality 
given by the journal’s reputation and the indicators provided by ranking, such as the impact factor. 
In many circumstances, incumbents can exploit uniqueness and leverage market power by 
clustering—i.e., bundling—together several copyrighted items. This reinforces the incumbent’s 
position vis-à-vis newcomers
21. 
This rationale seems to have characterized the journal-publishing industry, where a handful of 
incumbents now control large catalogues (the so-called Big Deal) and a substantial share of the 
markets across distinct fields (e.g. economics, medical sciences, chemistry, etc.), while the residual 
segment of every field is made up of minor players—publishers of a single journal or a few titles—
that operate in just that segment or at most in a limited number of fields (Edlin & Rubinfeld, 2004; 
Dewatripont et al., 2006). 
This  pattern of “major-minor” firms replicates  what is happening in many copyright 
industries, starting with the seminal case of the recording business. There is regular entry and exit in 
the minor segment (independent labels, in the music business) and substantial stability in the major 
segment (Silva & Ramello, 2000). This difference points to a discrepancy in competition that can 
only be explained by the fact that the two segments are different markets to a certain extent, and 
there are barriers to moving from the minor to the major segment.
5.1 The industry of economics journals: a case study
The industrial trajectory described above highlights the role of copyright control in endogenously 
defining the market structure, which is consequently not the cause but the outcome of the precise 
strategies adopted by right holders in order to gain or extend market power. 
In order to properly qualify this assertion for the journal-publishing sector, the rest of this 
section will discuss the field of economics during the period 1999-2007. To better focus on the 
competitive process, the analytical lens is provided by industrial economics and antitrust practice, 
which are naturally suited to describing the extended competitive process. 
The first step is to define the boundaries of the “relevant market,” i.e. the set of products and 
geographical areas that can create competitive constraints on each other (see Motta, 2004). As 
argued above, while to some extent every journal or even article is a poorly substitutable product to 
the scholar, an investigation of competition must focus on the true demand, which in our case is 
essentially comprised of libraries albeit acting as agents for scholars
22. 
From the library’s standpoint, demand is less rigid than for the individual scholar, so what 
matters is the availability of a number of journals and collections (bundles) rather than single 
titles
23. We can then use two criteria to identify the relevant market in accordance with antitrust 
practice. The first, relating to geographical area, relies on language
24; although partitioned into 
national groups, the economics community is global, so the real division is between English and 
non-English language journals. The latter are country specific and at most complement rather than 
substitute for the former. 
The second criterion concerns product quality and substitutability. Demand from the library 
considers many aspects relating to the final demand from readers, mainly scholars and students. 
Although many criteria can be endorsed, the rough goal is to select the best possible quality, and the 
21 For an in depth discussion also referring to some antitrust cases and a formal treatment see Nicita & Ramello (2007).
22 On the role of libraries as buyers, see Parks (2001) and McCabe (2002).
23 For the library the idea is to maximize the number of readers within the given institution, which happens even though 
a number of readers are not satisfied.
24 This criterion is heavily used in many media sectors, including television. See for instance the cases mentioned in 
Nicita & Ramello (2007).
9most widely adopted measure for ensuring a minimal level of quality is the journal’s inclusion on 
the ISI-Thompon impact factor list (Garfield, 2005). 
The top journals are included on this list and at high levels the signal is clear, while it becomes 
less precise for low-ranking journals, whose quality is perfectly comparable to non-ISI publications. 
Hence, inclusion on the ISI list is a somewhat restrictive and imperfect selection criterion, as many 
good and very good journals are not listed. Still, it seems reasonable to assert that because of their 
“proximity” to highly ranked journals, low ISI ranked journals have a comparative advantage over 
non-ISI journals and this makes them somewhat less substitutable
25. On the whole the criterion 
appears plausible, as emphasized elsewhere (Garfield, 2005; Dewatripoint et al., 2006), and can be 
roughly used to identify what we can call the “market for academic attention” for scholarly journals.
Table 1: Journals listed in ISI - “economics,” 1999-2007
Source: elaboration on ISI-Thomson figures
Table 1 illustrates the cohort for the period observed. The overall increase during the period of 
15.75% (second column) confirms the relevance of being ISI listed, which is underestimated as 
entry is rationed by Thomson and only a small fraction of applicants are accepted by ISI every year. 
In the field of economics, a rising number of top ranked journals are now in the hands of a few 
publishing houses. Even though a number of journals are still owned and run by scientific societies
—in economics, leading universities such as Harvard and the University of Chicago and scientific 
associations such as the AEA publish the leading journals in the field—commercial publishers own 
an extensive number of titles and a considerable share of the market. 
Consequently, journals can be easily divided by mission into “not for profit” (NFP) 
publishers, those rooted in the history of scholarly journals and essentially comprising scientific 
associations and university presses, and “for profit” (FP) publishers, i.e. undertakings that make a 
profitable business of publishing, in strict accordance with profit maximization rules
26.
The journal figures disaggregated by mission show that net entry is greatly in favor of FP 
journals although, as argued below, the average quality is higher in NFP journals. Actually, in the 
period observed the net increase in NFP journals was +28 items, while for FP this value was 
negative (-4 items), signalling a sharp share increase trend in the FP segment—which of course 
translates into markets shares as reported in Table 2.







Springer Elsevier Sharpe Other 
commercial
Academic CR4*
1999 17.690 3.918 6.383 22.706 0.465 7.398 41.440 50.697
2002 19.968 4.201 7.278 24.796 0.424 5.696 37.637 56.243
25 A low ranked ISI journal can more easily become a high ranked ISI journal than a non-ISI journal. The perceived 
probability of being a good journal is therefore enhanced by the simple fact of being on the list. It is worth noting that 
many research assessment systems the around the world use the ISI/non-ISI label as a basic litmus test.
26 This division seems to be reasonable and descriptive even though different groupings are possible, e.g. by considering 
the university presses as an intermediate case. 
Year no. of journals NFP + NFP - FP+ FP-
1999 165 / / / /
2002 166 3 5 11 8
2004 172 2 5 8 2
2007 191 6 5 21 4
102004 19.988 4.274 8.275 24.453 0.326 6.480 36.204 56.990
2007 18.618 5.606 8.127 25.997 0.648 5.413 35.590 58.348
Source: elaboration on ISI-Thomson data
The industrial framework, as discussed, is an oligopoly in which a handful of commercial 
players compete against societies or university presses and minor commercial players. The figures 
in Table 2 are disaggregated for the top five commercial publishers, while the rest of them, which 
occupy a very low share, have been grouped into “other commercial” for the sake of readability. 
The same has been done with university presses and scientific associations. 
It is fairly evident that within the FP publishers, the top four serve appreciable shares of 
demand, while from the fifth on each journal serves less than the 1% of the market. The same sharp 
division applies to impact factor, as on average (Table 3) the big players show stronger values that 
increase with the years.
The percentage of market share held by the top four firms (CR4) is the most widely used 
concentration ratio, and in our case demonstrates a highly concentrated market that is increasingly 
so over time. Now it is well known in industrial economics that the link between concentration and 
market power cannot be taken for granted because of the available data or the high elasticity of 
demand (Donsimoni, Geroski & Jacquemin, 1984), and there are cases in which the opposite is true 
(Salop & Stiglitx, 1977).
However, in journal-publishing, substitutability (although somewhat higher for libraries) is 
significantly constrained by readers who when needing an article see one journal as a very poor 
substitute for others and moreover they require access to a substantial catalogue of journals that 
necessarily includes the highly ranked. Hence price elasticity is not high, and as demonstrated in the 
literature, we can easily assess that in such a case the calculated concentration rate rather 
understates the true quantum of market power (Scherer, 1980). 
Moreover, there is a clear-cut argument that the dramatic increase in prices would not be 
sustainable in a competitive environment. It is therefore plausible to assume that market power is 
responsible for the high and increasing concentration. 
Along with the shift of the market in the hands of FP publishers, which has moved from a 
CR4 of 50% to almost 60% in less than 10 years despite a lower perceived quality (as shown by 
average impact factor in Table 3, especially at the beginning of the observation period), the above 
remark signals that there is a drift in the market’s attention that cannot be easily explained on the 
grounds of standard competition. Rather, it shows that endogenous features are working to redirect 
what would be the free choice of demand in a competitive market in which readers choose and buy 
the journals of higher quality. 





Springer Elsevier Sharpe Other FP Academic
1999 0.451 0.274 0.341 0.592 0.174 0.377 0.829
2002 0.559 0.323 0.427 0.710 0.174 0.319 0.827
2004 0.609 0.358 0.529 0.763 0.146 0.395 0.867
2007 0.604 0.500 0.552 0.863 0.308 0.351 0.907
Source: elaboration on ISI-Thomson data
Although all the impact factors (FP and NFP) are increasing (Table 3), it is fairly evident that 
in general, academic journals perform better. Just one commercial publisher ranks closely, while the 
others publish less highly ranked journals. Now, in a static framework one would expect the  more 
highly ranked journals (NFP) to prevail. Yet the previous figures showed that NFP journals are 
more rapidly exiting the market, even though a greater rate of failure should be expected for their 
11less “attractive” FP counterparts. Consequently, there has to be something else affecting the 
competitive process and altering the expected outcome.
Here is where bundling comes in. Many articles have discussed how the endogenous strategy 
introduced   by   commercial   publishers   with   extended   catalogues   favors   the   endorsement   of 
commercial policies of bundling rather than competition among titles (McCabe, 2002; Edlin & 
Rubinfeld, 2004; Dewatripont et al., 2006; Cavaleri et al., 2009). The rationale is that the rigidity of 
the buyer towards at least a number of items included in the catalogue can be leveraged in order to 
sell the entire bundle at the cost of individually published journals. The publisher exploits the extra 
willingness to pay for highly ranked journals and can sell the bundled items at a lower price than the 
competitive product, so that demand subject to budget constraints shifts towards the better priced 
bundle.
Essentially, the strategy of selling bundles while enjoying market power in one market can be 
leveraged in order to control a secondary bundled market, inasmuch as the seller of two bundled 
items can price them lower than the sum of buying them separately from different producers. 
Assuming for instance a highly ranked journal A, and two lower ranked journals B and C (which 
are more substitutable for one another), if one seller is the publisher of A and B and sells the bundle 
at a price  C A B A p p p + < +  (where the right side describes the price of buying two journals A and C 
separately from two publishers), then the strategy will likely favor the publisher of many journals 
and will essentially foreclose the market to the single journal publisher.
This effect  will be amplified if we assume that there are demand network externalities 
affecting the evaluation of the journals (which seems to be the case, as the importance of a journal 
and an article increases the more researchers use it and make it an essential input for a given stream 
of research) and that buyers are also constrained by the opportunity costs of buying journals, since 
they must buy books as well (Edlin & Rubinfeld, 2004).
If in the short run the bundling strategy could produce some gains in term of consumer 
welfare
27, in the long run it favors the persistence of incumbents, which can be problematic for the 
competitiveness of the scholarly publication market and the variety of publishers.
TABLE 4: Quality distribution: percent of journals with an IF greater than 1, 2007
  Blackwell Routledge 
T&F
Springer Elsevier Sharpe Other FP Academic
% of journals 
with IF>1 18.182 12.500 23.810 37.209 n.s. 18.182 39.286
Source: calculation on ISI-Thomson data
Table 4 depicts the share of highly ranked economics journals in the year 2007, where 
“highly” is defined as an impact factor of greater than 1
28.
Clearly only a fraction of the commercial publishers’ catalogue is highly ranked, and this 
serves as a lever to sell other publications. Since researchers must have the high IF journal in order 
to achieve their own advances, this is tantamount to opening the library door to the entire catalogue
29. 
27 If the publisher prices journal A above the monopoly price when sold alone, buyers will chose the bundle A+B and 
there will be no gains, while the market will be foreclosed for publisher C.
28 While a journal with IF>1 is in general a well esteemed publication, one could object that this is too low a threshold. 
However, this will actually strengthen the discussion here as the outcome in terms of share would be restrained and 
would show how controlling a few “good” journals permits the bundling of inferior ones.
29 The correlation of 0.89 between this value and market share in the same year, although imperfect (as we are grouping 
other commercial and academic publishers), suggests that market share is closely connected to the control of some 
highly ranked journals.
12However, the picture given here is under-representative, as many of the publishers with high 
market shares in economics are also active in many other fields, so their ability to exploit the sale of 
catalogues is very much enhanced.
The current FP incumbents with large market shares in economics are involved in many of the 
other fields, which number 22 in all. As of this writing Elsevier is involved in all 22 fields, while 
Wiley-Blackwell, Routledge/Francis & Taylor and Springer-Kluwer are active in 21. The only 
exception is Lippincott, which did not show up in this picture as it is incumbent in only four fields 
and is a major player in two of them.
6. Copyright, competition and exclusion in the market for academic attention: discussion
The rationale for copyright is that it promotes Schumpeterian innovation race: as argued above, in 
the case of a successful copyrighted work, the right holder can reap the associated economic 
benefit. The underlying economic model is that of a competitive process in which new products 
compete with older ones all the time and the successful ones earn a reward. Hence, the incumbents 
are only temporary and their success in the market should be challenged in every subsequent race 
by other competitors.
The observation of copyright industries in general and of scholarly journals in particular 
shows that this picture is very far from reality. In fact, it is more the exception than the rule.
The standard situation is that of a concentrated industry in which the incumbents progressively 
increase their market shares and jointly dominate a large segment of the market, which to a great 
extent can be considered a distinct market with no substantial entry and exit. The rest of the market 
is then populated by other subjects that live in a more competitive environment. This partitioned 
structure characterizes many copyright markets, including sound recording, the movie industry and 
operating systems
30. It is also the representative structure in journal publishing, either per field or in 
general.
Many issues require further discussion. First, the model justifying copyright no longer seems 
to apply. While concentration per se does not translate into lack of competition, the dramatic 
increase in the market price of scientific journals (with non increasing possibly decreasing costs) 
suggests that substantial market power exists. This stems from the idiosyncratic nature of journals 
and articles, which are poorly substitutable, especially when the difference in perceived quality 
produces a sharp differentiation.
Therefore, while there are no substantial entry barriers to the overall market for new journals, 
demand inertia makes it very difficult to attract attention from the scientific community. This has 
much to do with reputation and the value that scholars attribute to a journal. Hence there are 
structural entry barriers to the “market for academic attention,” which is really the relevant market. 
The conclusion is consistent with the findings of other studies
31.
Furthermore, the particular features of this market for attention permit the creation of strategic 
entry barriers that progressively reinforce the dominance of incumbents at the cost of other 
publishers. The pivotal element of this strategy is bundling, which favors the success of new 
journals that are part of a bundle, even though the overall quality is not always the best. The mere 
existence of a few good journals in the bundle can be leveraged to attract attention to lower ranked 
journals, at the expense of potential competitors who are unable to exploit bundling. In the long run, 
this trend self-enforces attention toward the entire bundle and the ranking of all the incumbent 
journals.
30 For references see Silva & Ramello (2000) and Cavaleri et al. (2009), among others.
31 Edlin & Rubinfeld (2004, p.138) discuss the topic in depth and conclude that “the likelihood of success [of a new 
journal] is small unless the journal has some particularly valuable and distinctive innovation.”
13The dynamics described above illustrate once again that copyright is much more than a neutral 
feature of the market: it is a tool that endogenously shapes the market structure, with consequences 
that in most cases foster rent-seeking behaviors and a gradual shift away from competition. 
This outcome has at least two unwelcome consequences in the world of scientific research. 
First, it raises the cost of research, which is by nature a cumulative process where (copyrighted) 
knowledge is at the same time (publishing) output and input for further advances (Ramello, 2008). 
Hence the endogenous shift of market structure toward market power makes this process more 
costly and difficult, with some additional paradoxical effects as for journal publishing the inputs of 
publication are freely provided by scholars.
Second, in the case of scientific publishing, journals are acting as gatekeepers of the ideas 
disseminated among the scientific community. The preferred outcome that would preserve full 
accessibility to any potentially interesting idea requires the existence of a neutral environment, so 
that the “Republic of Science” that ought to characterize the scholarly community can freely work
32. 
The drift from a republic toward an oligarchy raises concerns about the safeguarding of this process 
that real competition would be better able to preserve.
Further, many journal articles are the outcome of previously funded research. Consequently, 
publication is just a way to certify quality and make the articles available to the community. In itself 
this is not expensive, and even research societies and universities can afford it, especially in the 
Internet era. Journals, while increasingly squeezing the budgets of research institutions, do not 
provide any remuneration for the upstream inputs that make them valuable, and their price is to a 
great extent not justified.
What is intriguing, however, in the current state of affairs is that copyright once more shows 
inertia toward aggregating rights. Contrary to many situations in which property rights experience 
inertia towards increasing fragmentation, in a pattern suggesting the existence of entropy (Parisi, 
2007), for copyright—and intellectual property rights in general—the motion is reversed in a path 
of continuous concentration. 
While the aggregation of rights could be beneficial to the social welfare when it lowers 
transaction costs (and examples of this do exist
33), there are serious concerns as it is essentially re-
creating the market structure that in 1710 forced the birth of the first copyright law, the Statute of 
Anne. This act was the outcome of intense civil protest by many members of society, including 
property rights champion John Locke, against the monopoly on book publishing and distribution 
enjoyed in England for nearly 150 years by the Stationers’ Company, which had seriously 
hampered the quality and the quantity of books sold (Nicita & Ramello, 2007). The simple yet 
powerful solution brought about by Queen Anne was to break up property rights over an entire 
catalogue (constituting a monopoly situation) into small units—copyrights over individual books—
in order to make the market more competitive.
Today, in many cases including journal publishing, catalogues have been reconstructed and 
seem to be a strategic lever used in most copyright industries.
Once again, competition seems to be the key issue for safeguarding the broader social welfare. 
Nevertheless, investigations so far have been rare and inconclusive. The problem may be due to the 
lack of tools for properly investigating dynamic efficiency. In any case, the conclusions thus far 
available are ambiguous.
The British market for scientific, technical and medical (STM) journals was brought to light 
through an investigation by the UK Office of Fair Trading. This antitrust authority has not yet found 
it appropriate to intervene, but somewhat ambiguously asserts that the “position will be kept under 
review” as “there is evidence to suggest that the market for STM journals may not be working well” 
and “many commercial journal prices appear high, at the expense of education and research 
institutions” (OFT, 2002, p. 4). John Vickers, the Director General of Fair Trading, stressed that 
“[j]ournals are the principal means by which scientific knowledge is disseminated. The market, 
32 See Ramello, 2005b.
33 Patent pools, for instance, are designed to solve this kind of problem.
14which operates worldwide, has a number of features that suggest that competition may not be 
working effectively. However, market forces harnessing new technology may change this without 
the need for intervention”
34.
This attitude is puzzling, as it more or less relies on the device heavily exploited in Greek 
tragedies: the deus ex-machina, i.e. an exogenous technological shock that independently solves the 
problem. The persistence of monopoly, the breadth of interconnected dominance and the random 
path of technological change suggest that a different attitude, giving due consideration to the 
endogenous effect of laws on market structure and the behavior of economic agents, would better 
inform policy in copyright industries. 
7. Conclusions
This article explores the journal publishing industry in order to shed light on the overall economic 
consequences of copyright in markets. Until now, the economic debate on copyright has mainly 
treated the right as given, trying at most to determine whether it encourages creative activity. We 
argue here that this is just one of the incentives provided by copyright. 
Since the rationale for copyright is essentially to promise some market power to the holder of 
the successful copyrighted item, it also provides incentives to preserve and extend market power. A 
regular trait of copyright industries is high concentration and the creation of large catalogues of 
copyrights in the hands of incumbents. This outcome can be observed as the aggregation of rights 
and is one of the pivotal strategies for obtaining or extending market power, consistently with 
findings in other cases. Journal publishing is no different in this respect from other copyright 
industries, and in the last decade has experienced a similar trajectory, leading to a highly 
concentrated industry in which a handful of large firms increasingly control a substantial part of the 
market. 
This situation raises concerns about the governance and efficiency of scientific activity, as it 
affects access to previously created ideas and puts a small number of gatekeepers in charge of 
selecting scientific ideas. 
It also provides a clear example of the effect of copyright dynamics on market structure, 
suggesting that a different attitude should be taken in lawmaking and law enforcement. 
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